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European Union development policy is almost as old as integration itself: five decades have now elapsed since the first Yaoundé Convention was concluded with the newly independent states of Africa, a framework that itself built upon the foundations of the earlier Articles of Association of the Treaty of Rome focused on overseas territories and colonial dependencies of the Member States. In that time, the Union has become one of the most significant donors of development assistance, the European institutions, for example, having committed €9.9 billion in 2014 (European Commission, 2015: 21) 1 . In the Union's own words, it is 'at the core of worldwide efforts to improve lives through development' (European Commission, 2013: 10) .
Notwithstanding the intent to act globally, it is evident that the Union's approach to the developing world has been geographically inconsistent, with developing countries in certain regions -Africa foremost, alongside the Caribbean and Pacific -receiving significantly more attention and resources than those elsewhere. The states of Asia provide a prominent example. Explanations for such exclusion, however, remain few, and usually Union-centric, rooted in theoretical frameworks premised either on the primacy of the EU as actor and the way in which its policy choices shape relations with the developing world (e.g. Normative Power Europe), or on the role of its Member States and institutions in determining Union preferences (e.g. historic institutionalism). Such analyses of the shape and extent of Union policy are important though incomplete explanations. Notably absent has been consideration of the wider development discipline and the conceptual debates that have taken place therein -it is an ongoing irony in the study of EU development policy that broader development theory paradigms have been largely ignored. And yet it is clear that such conceptual debates on the nature of development and underdevelopment have played a significant part in shaping the development polices of state and non-state actors 3 over time, providing a context within which state and institutional preferences are formed.
As a conceptual lens, therefore, this body of development theory offers potential further insights into the contours and structure of EU development policy and practice, and further nuance to existing approaches (Doidge, 2014) .
Taking a step back from Union-centric explanations, this article views EU development policy and its relations with developing countries in the context of evolving debates around development, in so doing recognising the importance of these exogenous influences in defining its development relations. Focusing on the EU's relations with Asia (defined as the states of East and Southeast Asia), it examines the tension between two factors -(i) the Union's perceptions of Asia, and (ii) the shaping of the Union's policy framework in response to external debates on the nature of development -which has helped structure its approach to the region. It is to the intersection between these two elements -in their initial dissonance and subsequent congruence -it is argued, that the Union's initial side-lining of Asian states and more recent reorientation of its development relationship with the region may, at least in part, be attributed.
The Absence of Asia
Development has never been a priority in EU-Asia relations, notwithstanding historical ties and the significant development issues that have, at varying times, confronted the region.
As the Union was establishing its core development frameworks in the decades following the Treaty of Rome, for example, the majority of Asian states stood at very similar levels of economic development (in terms of per capita GDP) to their counterparts in Africa (see Table 1 ), and had comparable colonial backgrounds (particularly following the United Kingdom's accession in 1973) . And yet, notwithstanding such commonalities, they found 4 themselves excluded from the development frameworks -the Yaoundé Convention and, most importantly, the Lomé Convention -that the EU was building with its African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) partners. As a consequence of such exclusion, assistance to the region has historically been at a much lower level, and has tended to be more ad hoc and short-termist in nature. It was not until 1974, for example, that a programme of Financial and Technical Assistance (FTA) was put in place, allowing the Union for the first time to provide programmed development interventions. Prior to this, support to the region had been limited to humanitarian relief. Subsequently, in the 25 years to 1991, the Union allocated some €1.2 billion in aid to East and Southeast Asia (European Commission, 1994a: 30), a figure dwarfed by the €15.5 billion received by the ACP over the same period. Further, it was not until the passage of the 1992 Asia-Latin America (ALA) Regulation that the EU moved from a one-year to five-year planning cycle for its programmes in the region. In short, Asian developing countries received very different treatment from that of their ACP counterparts.
Making the contrast more stark has been the way in which the Union has defined itself as a development actor and its relations with developing countries. The EU has always portrayed its relations with the developing world in a very specific way -as an expression of 'the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries' and the 'desir[e] to ensure their development and prosperity' (Preamble to the Treaty of Rome), reflecting a sense of ethical or moral obligation (Grilli, 1993: 3) to 'shoulder its responsibilities ' (European Commission, 1971: 14) . In this respect, it has been characterised as a 'purely humanitarian aim' (Lemaignen, 1960: 1) , implying that need is the driving factor, and has been associated with principles such as equity and social justice: 'the fight for a new, more just and more equitable, economic order' said Commissioner for Development Claude Cheysson, 'cannot 5 be confined to the frontiers of Europe' (Cheysson, 1976: 9 (Mimica, 2014: 2) . While the impetus is clearly a global one, variation in application has been evident since the outset, with states such as those in Asia historically less well served. The Union's sense of moral or ethical obligation, its expression of solidarity, has, in other words, been only partially observed, notwithstanding early recognition that 'world-wide' includes Asia (Drieghe, 2011: 174) .
Explaining Absence
EU-Asia development relations have been shaped by a number of tensions. Asian exclusion at the moment of policy formation, for example, has been attributed to factors including its relative remoteness (by comparison to francophone Africa), its vulnerability as a source of raw materials given the regional influences of China and the Soviet Union (brought sharply into focus by the events in Korea and Indochina), and to ongoing British influence (of particular significance to the France of Charles de Gaulle) (Grilli, 1993: 272-273) . Such an historically rooted explanation, however, offers little to clarify the subsequent evolution of the relationship. Beyond this early reality, evident is an ongoing dynamic involving two interlocking factors that has shaped the EU-Asia development relationship over succeeding decades. It is the intersection between the EU's view of Asia and its conceptualisation of development that has defined the changing priority afforded issues of development in Europe-Asia relations. Notable, in this respect, has been the extent to which external debates on the nature of development have shaped EU policy and, as a consequence, its development relations with the region.
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The Perception Factor
In the early years of European integration, Asia was something of an invisible region. With no particular advocate for engagement among its original membership, and with limited resources to conduct its external relations, for the EU Asia was to remain the unknown other, until, that is, economic pressures began to tell. The economic rise initially of the four Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan) in the 1960s and subsequently, and of more direct significance to the Union, the concerted push to follow suit by the Tiger Cubs (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand) from the end of that decade laid the foundations for a reconceptualisation of the region. From a position as suppliers of commodities and importers of manufactured goods, these countries undertook an exportled growth strategy focused on the production of labour-intensive finished goods and components, resulting in a fundamental shift in their basic patterns of trade over little more than a decade. This 'economic miracle' forced a reorientation in the Union's view of Asia from one of 'asymmetrical indifference' (Rüland, 2001: 9) , to one coloured by economic interests and particularly conceptions of competition and threat, notwithstanding that such economic success was not universal in the region.
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As a consequence of this view, from the 1970s two (broadly neo-mercantilist) strands became evident in the relationship. The first was an interest in benefiting from Asian growth, stemming from a concern as to potential marginalisation in the region. Trade and market access therefore constituted key factors underpinning both the conclusion of a (Turner, 1982: 137) , while a series of Voluntary Export Restraints were leveraged on a range of other products (Grilli, 1993: 281) .
Similarly, a tightening of the Generalised System of Preferences saw a significant reduction in the value of import concessions (Turner, 1982: 140-141 (Grilli, 1993: 283, 8 van Reisen, 1999: 146-147 (Koopman, 1984: 104) .
It is this Asia, viewed through the prism of economics and trade and conditioned by perceptions 3 of competition and threat, around which EU relations with the region have been built. This view established an effective baseline for the region generally, with which various thematic policy frameworks (including, prominently, development) have
intersected. That such a vision has become deep-rooted may be evidenced through recent analyses of public and media perceptions affirming that, in the European gaze, Asia continues to be strongly defined both by the market opportunities it offers and by its competitive threat (Bersick et al., 2012: 279-280) . It has been in the intersection between this perception of Asia and the way in which development itself has been conceived and understood by the EU (shaped in turn by external debates) that the broad shape of the development relationship between the two has been determined.
The Meaning of Development
The EU is perhaps unique among international development actors in the extent to which its approach to issues of development has changed over time, a product of the influence of 
The Shape of EU-Asia Development Relations
Together, these elements produced a scenario in which development issues were downplayed in EU-Asia relations. The disconnect between EU perceptions of the region and its conception of development (informed by exogenous models) meant that, notwithstanding significant and ongoing need within the region, this was never a focus of engagement. Instead, evident was a tendency to focus on the 'dynamic economies' , 1991: 172-174, 178-181, 1993: 110-112, 137-139) .
Notwithstanding the modesty of assistance to Asia, the situation was additionally complicated by the fact that aid was not necessarily directed toward those states for which the need was greatest. Instead, as has long been acknowledged in the literature on aid Commission, 1981 : Annex I, 1986 : 22, 1990 : 15, 1992b : 18, 1994a . Indeed, across these 25 years, programmed assistance of this type to the CLMV states stood at only one-third the level committed for food aid, humanitarian relief and disaster response (European Commission, 1994a: 30) . When it came to Asia, the European Union focus was very much on emerging markets rather than developing countries.
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The Emergence of Asia
Where Asia's relative historic absence from EU development policy is explicable through the disconnect between these two elements, their reconfiguration in the post-bipolar period reflected the alignment of the Union's perceptions of Asia with its (largely externally defined) vision of development, producing notable changes in its approach to the developing countries of the region.
Reconfiguring Development
The (Stevens and Killick, 1989: 27) . While adjustment was seen as necessary (Frisch and Boidin, 1988: 3), however, the IMF/World Bank model was viewed as too ideologically rigid by an EU interested in a more 'pragmatic and differentiated' approach (Council, 1988: 101) reflective of Lomé's 'ideological neutrality' (European Commission, 1992c: 16), and which was both non-coercive and cognisant of the social dimension of adjustment (Council, 1988: 101-102). While such an approach was formally reflected in Lomé IV's adjustment provisions (Arts.243-250), the reality proved somewhat different. Internally, the vision programmes (Brown, 1999: 77) . The response to Structural Adjustment, then, helped make the realignment of the Union's conception of development more stark, dragging the framework further towards the new mainstream than had initially been envisaged. What became increasingly evident in the EU's vision of development was a transition from an 17 understanding of the international system as a place of evident inequity (as the Union viewed it through the filter of dependency) to one which saw the market as an even playing field, and from the view that market imperfections justified schemes such as STABEX and SYSMIN (Pirzio-Biroli, 1980: 5) to one that saw such price support structures and nonreciprocal market access arrangements as producing an ongoing lack of competitiveness (European Commission, 1992a: Annex §2.2.2). Increased competitiveness and integration into a liberalised world economy (European Commission, 1992a : 11, Council, 1992 : § §10, 18), alongside access to private funding through capital markets and bank loans (Council, 1992 : §10), were now seen as the key to economic growth and therefore development.
Contributing further to this reorientation was the increasing prominence of alternative people-centred development frames that had emerged in various forms from the 1970s and gained traction particularly from the 1980s, balancing the market values of neoliberalism with an emphasis on liberal political values and social concerns. By the 1990s these various strands had cohered around a framework of Human Development that, while essentially grafted on to a foundation of neoliberal market economics, was human-focused, pro-poor, concerned with equity, social justice and human rights, green, endogenous and participatory (Pieterse, 1998: 354) , and was ever more embedded in international institutions. The prioritisation of poverty reduction (conceived in terms beyond simple economic deprivation) that was central to this framework, and around which the international community had progressively oriented itself over the course of the 1990s, was given formal expression in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Again, these external conceptualisations quickly found their way into EU policy. 19 By the new millennium, then, the Union's conception of development had undergone significant evolution. Reflecting the new global development agenda, for the Union free market economics and global free trade had increasingly become aligned with development, while a significant refocusing on the LDCs and on 'need' had become evident.
The assumption that had underpinned Lomé -that developing countries were special cases that requiring protection from fully free markets -had been rejected (though with some qualifications in the case of LDCs) in favour of a free market-centric notion of development, one which, importantly, has a certain synergy with the EU's own economic interests. The
Union's conception of development, in other words, conditioned by the evolution in development thinking that gathered momentum through the 1980s and 1990s, has become increasingly aligned with its broader free trade agenda. Reinforcing this trend has been a process at the global level of casting development in terms of mutual benefit, rather than within a North-South donor-recipient dyad, a frame within which the Sustainable Development Goals have very much been forged, and one which has become ever more evident in EU development rhetoric, as with Commissioner for Development Neven Mimica's assertion that '[d]evelopment policy aims for partnership based on mutual interests' (Mimica, 2014: 2). 5 Significantly, this is a reorientation that has drawn the EU's role as a development actor more closely into line with its long-standing perceptions of the Asian region. That issues of trade and market opening are no-longer conceived as contrary to, but rather as supportive or indeed fundamental to development goals, has created space for the EU to pursue economic interests in a manner consistent with its development ideals, and as an expression of solidarity with the developing world. Development, in this view, need not 20 involve a significant concession of economic interests in the way that the logics of Lomé arguably did.
Reshaping EU-Asia Development Relations
Just as the prior dissonance had shaped the relative absence of development from EU-Asia relations, it is in the reconceptualisation of development and its greater alignment with the As with EU-ASEAN dialogue, the ASEM process, instituted in 1996 to relaunch and deepen relations between the two regions, remained largely silent on development for much of its history. While established to be an expansive dialogue with no a priori exclusions, the motivations underpinning its creation were primarily economic, a situation 
Conclusion
What is evident then is that there has been an apparent change in the place of development in EU-Asia relations, and that this has been significantly shaped by the tension between, on the one hand, the European Union's perception of the Asian region and, on the other, the evolution in its conceptualisation of development as a response to exogenous theoretical debate. In this respect, the Union's baseline approach to Asia -its primarily economic focus, countries. This has facilitated the folding of development into the Union's largely economicfocused Asia policy. In addition, the re-focusing on need has produced a willingness to view the region with greater nuance than was previously the case, contributing in practice to increased differentiation within the region, and a reconfiguration of aid allocations. The rise of development in EU-Asia relations has therefore not primarily been about the Union rectifying an absence in its relations with the developing world, but rather about its conception of development -shaped and defined by external debates -becoming aligned with its interests in Asia. 
